Untangling a web of lies: Exploring automated detection of deception in computer-mediated communication by Ludwig, S. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Ludwig, S., van Laer, T., de Ruyter, K. & Friedman, M. (2016). Untangling a web 
of lies: Exploring automated detection of deception in computer-mediated communication. 
Journal of Management Information Systems, 33(2), pp. 511-541. doi: 
10.1080/07421222.2016.1205927 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/15306/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07421222.2016.1205927
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
1 
 
1 
 
Untangling a Web of Lies:  
Exploring Automated Detection of Deception in Computer-Mediated Communication 
      
Contact Details 
(In order of authorship) 
 
1. Stephan Ludwig 
Senior Lecturer in Marketing 
Westminster Business School 
University of Westminster     
35 Marylebone Road 
NW1 5LS London, 
UK 
Tel.: +44 (0) 2035 06 67 64  
E-Mail: s.ludwig@westminster.ac.uk 
 
2. Tom van Laer  
Senior Lecturer in Marketing 
Cass Business School  
City University London 
106 Bunhill Row 
EC1Y 8TZ London,  
UK 
Tel.: +44 20 7040 0324 
E-Mail: tvanlaer@city.ac.uk 
 
3. Ko de Ruyter 
Professor of Marketing 
Cass Business School  
City University London 
106 Bunhill Row 
EC1Y 8TZ London,  
UK 
E-Mail: Ko.De-Ruyter.1@city.ac.uk 
 
4. Mike Friedman 
Associated Researcher 
Louvain School of Management 
Catholic University of Louvain 
Chaussée de Binche, 151 
B-7000 Mons 
Belgium 
Tel.: +32 65 32 33 71 
E-Mail: mike.friedman@uclouvain-mons.be 
  
2 
 
2 
 
Untangling a Web of Lies:  
Exploring Automated Detection of Deception in Computer-Mediated Communication 
 
Biographical Statements 
 
Stephan Ludwig is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Marketing & Business Strategy 
Westminster Business School. He has a Ph.D. in Marketing and eight years of consulting 
experience in marketing research for financial services, FMCGs and communication services. 
His research interests focus on communication design, e-commerce and marketing strategy 
and is published in leading international journals including the Journal of Marketing, MIS 
Quarterly, IJEC, and other outlets.  
 
Tom van Laer is Senior Lecturer in Marketing at Cass Business School. His research 
appears in premier and leading academic journals, including the Journal of Consumer 
Research, International Journal of Research in Marketing, Journal of Business Ethics, 
Journal of Interactive Marketing, and other outlets. Tom’s publications reflect his interest in 
storytelling, social media, and consumer behaviour. Previously, he was Assistant Professor at 
ESCP Europe Business School and a visiting scholar at the Universities of Sydney and New 
South Wales in Australia. He holds a doctorate in marketing (PhD) from Maastricht 
University, the Netherlands. Though Tom has won awards for his academic research, 
teaching, and media exposure, he still counts winning his high school's story-reading 
competition in 1995 as his most impressive accomplishment. 
 
Ko de Ruyter is Professor of Marketing at Cass Business School, the UK. His research 
interests focus on social media, customer loyalty and environmental stewardship. He has 
published six books and numerous scholarly articles in among others the Journal of 
Marketing, Management Science, Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Retailing, 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, International Journal of Research in 
Marketing, Decision Sciences, Organization Science, Marketing Letters, Journal of 
Management Studies, Journal of Business Research, Journal of Economic Psychology, 
Journal of Service Research, Information and Management, European Journal of Marketing 
and Accounting, Organisation, Society and MIS Quarterly.  
 
Mike Friedman is an Associated Researcher at the Louvain School of Management, 
Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium. He holds a Ph.D. in social psychology from Texas 
A&M University. Mike’s research interests include consumer motivations, brands and 
branding, and text analysis.  
 
  
3 
 
3 
 
 
Untangling a Web of Lies:  
Exploring Automated Detection of Deception in Computer-Mediated Communication 
 
Abstract 
 
Safeguarding organizations against opportunism and severe deception in computer-mediated 
communication (CMC) presents a major challenge to CIOs and IT managers. New insights 
into linguistic cues of deception derive from the speech acts innate to CMC. Applying 
automated text analysis to archival email exchanges in a CMC system as part of a reward 
program, we assess the ability of word use (micro-level), message development (macro-
level), and intertextual exchange cues (meta-level) to detect severe deception by business 
partners. We empirically assess the predictive ability of our framework using an ordinal 
multilevel regression model. Results indicate that deceivers minimize the use of referencing 
and self-deprecation but include more superfluous descriptions and flattery. Deceitful channel 
partners also over structure their arguments and rapidly mimic the linguistic style of the 
account manager across dyadic e-mail exchanges. Thanks to its diagnostic value, the 
proposed framework can support firms’ decision-making and guide compliance monitoring 
system development.  
 
Keywords and Phrases: CMC between business partners, deception severity, speech act 
theory, automated text analysis 
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 Deceitful practices in business, ranging from white lies, flattery, and evasions to bald-
faced falsification, appear to be endemic to all sorts of day-to-day business interactions [17, 
65]. Recent research shows that deception is particularly common in business 
communications, with the more severe ones drastically interfering with the flow of 
information across organizations [1]. Deception in business can result in serious delicts, 
leading to lawsuits and in extreme cases, is costly to society at large. Estimations of the costs 
of deception in business-to-business (B2B) communication in the US range up to $200 billion 
annually [1]. Given information technology (IT)’s pervasiveness in facilitating most business 
communications it is little surprising that computer-mediated communication (CMC) is also 
frequently used to transmit deceitful information in business [2-4]. Intentionally designed “to 
foster a false belief or conclusion by the receiver” [5, p.205], deception is particularly a 
common problem in computer-mediated business requests and negotiations because a 
successful lie can earn one side tremendous advantages [1]. Furthermore, the isolation and 
relative anonymity of the communicators reduces interpersonal awareness and increases the 
truth bias. Moreover, unstructured CMC is mostly text based (e.g., e-mail), as opposed to the 
combination of spoken words, tone, and facial expressions used in face-to-face talks. 
Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the other person’s goals, mood, and motives [6]. Given 
the insufficient resources and the poor ability of humans to detect deception in 
communication in general [7] and in CMC in particular [8, 9], safeguarding organizations 
against opportunism and severe deception detection thus presents a major challenge to CIOs 
and IT managers [6].  
Although much research into deception in general communication has been conducted 
in the past several years [7], little support is provided for the detection of deception severity 
in the CMC field. An emerging body of research considers the viability of simple text 
features (i.e., single word cues) as predictors of deception [10]. Yet, such information system 
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research essentially enters linguistic terrain, which requires richer text interpretations to 
develop a more subtle profile of deception severity [2, 11]. Such interpretations appear innate 
to speech act theory [12, 13]. This theory proposes that any form of expression, whether 
vocal or textual, represents the performance of an act, intended at invoking some behavior in 
the receiver. Where a truthful act is directly related to the intent, the purpose of insincere acts 
is to keep the illegitimacy of the speaker’s claim hidden [14]. In the absence of an 
unambiguous cue, higher level linguistic context may matter greatly when investigating 
deception [7]. Accordingly, beyond single (or combinations of) words used in current CMC 
analysis systems, message development and exchanges may serve as further cues to detect 
deception [6]. Using conceptualizations of speech acts [12, 13, 15] this paper proposes and 
empirically validates a design framework for text analysis of deception  detection in CMC.  
First, we clarify the notion of insincere speech act and its implication in terms of 
deception, which constitutes the relevance of our model. We illustrate the various ways 
linguistic indicators relate to deception severity along its established dimensions of 
falsification, concealment, and equivocation [16]. Previous experimental, information 
systems research pertaining to instant messaging and chat room conversations suggests mixed 
insights about linguistic cues of deception [9, 17], but a rigorous field test of a theory-driven, 
comprehensive framework is lacking [11]. We systematically review the IS and 
communication literature to develop such a multilevel framework, accounting for the 
subtleties and complexities of deceitful communication in CMC.   
Second, we focus on within-message argument development. Previous information 
systems research has treated text as a unitary variable [18] or considered single (or 
combinations of) words [19]. However, in reality, severe deception often is developed 
sequentially across a series of sentences, where relative coherence or discord may also 
indicate deception [20]. To uncover how business partners purposefully develop deception 
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across a sequence of sentences, we therefore consider messages’ macro structures in CMC. 
Thus, we extend speech act theory to include the macro-level structural features evincing 
deceitful CMC.  
Third, we focus on the between-message interactional exchanges and assess the 
implications of linguistic style matching (LSM) for deception. Deceivers have an interest to 
make themselves appear more accommodating and likeable [21], which may manifest itself 
in close and rapid alignment of their communication style with that of their conversant across 
interactional exchanges. Following recent information systems research, such style alignment 
in CMC is symbolically reflected and may be measured considering the linguistic style 
matching (LSM) between conversant [22]. Extending speech act theory to the meta-level of 
conversation, we explore whether rapid LSM indicates deception in CMC. 
In the next section, we review the insights from research on deception in the CMC 
field in particular, highlighting the relevance of a multilevel framework and providing 
conceptual clarification of the terminology adopted in deception research. We formulate 
hypotheses aimed at assessing the relative predictions of deception severity in CMC between 
businesses and test these hypotheses with a large set of requests discussed as part of a reward 
program run by a global Fortune 100 company. We conclude by outlining the theoretical and 
practical implications of our findings with regard to the design and management of enhanced 
information systems to detect deception severity.  
 
 
Speech Act Theory on Deception 
Austin [12] coins the notion of speech acts. Using acting as a metaphor for speaking, he 
conceptualizes speech, whether vocal or textual, as the performance of “acts” that are aimed 
at invoking certain behavior, such as commanding, confirming, or questioning. He 
distinguishes analytically between locutionary speech acts, the acts of saying something; 
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illocationary speech acts, what individuals intend to achieve in saying something; and lastly 
perlocutionary speech acts, the actual effects of utterances on their audience. Searle [23] 
anticipates the linguistic discipline’s focus on illocutionary acts by arguing that linguistic 
cues at a higher level than “mere” words convey the intention of a speaker to tell the truth (or 
not) and, as a result, make a speech into an (in)sincere act. He also introduces the notion of 
insincere speech acts in which the connection between the truth and the utterance is not clear 
but troubled. Habermas [24, 25] later describes the speaker’s intention to tell the truth (or not) 
as a condition that validates a speech act. Notably, this intention of the speaker makes the 
legitimacy or the truth of a communication (in)accessible to a receiver, thus marking a clear 
separation in terms of speaker/receiver and insincere/sincere, or deceitful/truthful. 
 Since speech act’s conceptualization, research has demonstrated that a speaker can 
install false beliefs in a receiver [23]. Subsequent studies have confirmed that an insincere 
speech act can succeed in persuading its receiver that the claim is legitimate and true [7]. If 
undetected, the effects can be strong and long-lasting. The effect that insincere speech acts 
achieve is deception of the claim receiver. However, the performance of insincere speech acts 
is markedly different from that of sincere speech acts, making it possible to detect liars. CMC 
is especially vulnerable to deception, as unstructured data is exchanged through emails [6, 
26]. The cue availability heuristics [27], information asymmetries, informational richness, 
and processing complexities [2] associated with these exchanges provide fertile ground for 
deception. Three established dimensions of deception severity—falsification, concealment, 
and equivocation [28]drive these insincere speech acts. 
 First, insincere speech acts may require that liars communicate claims that they 
consider false—the deceitful illocution. Second and third, liars may deceive through two 
main components: concealment and equivocation. In avoiding detection, liars may provide 
incomplete information or they may opt to be intentionally evasive, indirect, or vague. 
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Together, falsification, concealment, and equivocation offer an explanation for an insincere 
speech act to appear legitimate and true. In accordance with these features, we define (in) 
sincerity of a speech act as the extent to which a liar aims to persuade a receiver by (1) 
falsification to make a claim appear legitimate and a liar avoids detection by (2) concealment 
and (3) equivocation, which leads him or her to leak insincerity in linguistic features during 
communicative acts. 
 
Towards a Multilevel Framework of Deception in CMC 
Insincere speech acts are an unethical form of communication and as such have 
attracted much scholarly attention [7]. Several theories, such as the leakage [29] and four 
factor theory [30], explain deception at the single-word level. Leakage refers to involuntary 
physiological processes that “leak” unbidden in the form of tell-tale cues to deception; the 
physiological processes are the four factors of arousal, negative affect, cognitive load, and 
attempted control. Table 1 contains an overview of studies focused on uses of (combinations 
of) words as indicators of deception. Although various peculiar uses of specific ranges or 
combinations of words appear distinctly manifest or absent, the empirical evidence from 
these studies is mixed and inconclusive, which hampers the diagnosticity and predictive 
ability of linguistic cues of deception.  
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
Matsumoto and Hwang [10] highlight that these mixed findings primarily stem from 
an exclusive focus on monologues or comparative writing, rather than conversations as they 
occur in real, interactive exchanges. Extending prior classifications of deception, Xiao and 
Benbasat [31] also query the lack of insight into deception in inter-organizational CMC and 
DePaulo et al. [7] observe that deception studies have been conducted almost exclusively in 
university laboratories. As Miller and Stiff [32] caution, experiment participants have little 
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motivation to get away with their lie, minimal actual interaction with other participants, and 
an artificially high degree of self-consciousness.  
The equivocality of existing findings might further stem from the inability of such 
micro-level cues to do justice to nuanced, carefully crafted, deceitful communication [10]. 
Following this line of reasoning, Carlson et al. [11] indicate that no single behavior or 
specific cue sufficiently determines deception; nor the severity thereof. Accordingly, the 
feeling/thinking cues theory [29, 33] conceptualizes “leaks” at the macro level (e.g., an 
inconsistent or over-rehearsed claim). Buller and Burgoon [21] further conceptualize 
deception as interpersonal: Liars rely on adapting the style of their claim’s presentation to 
(their perception of) the receivers’ preferences. Similarly, self-presentational theory [7] 
demonstrates that liars are more concerned with their impression on others, which is less 
present in truth speakers. This multilevel approach to deception fully aligns with Abbasi and 
Chen [2] calling for externally valid, text mining research that considers the information 
embedded in the structure and exchange of textual CMC. 
In sum, even though speech act theory has laid the groundwork for understanding 
deception as actions situated at multiple levels, empirical evidence for this has essentially 
remained at the micro level of (combinations of) words [34]. Thus, a comprehensive model is 
overdue not only to advance knowledge on deception (severity) detection per se but also to 
complement speech act theory. Accordingly, we extend deception research to the macro-level 
of deceitful claims as bodies of texts patterned by structural features and explicitly consider 
conversation as a crucial resource for interpreting deception as an interactive and socially 
located phenomenon. Hence, we use a comprehensive approach, spanning all three levels of 
communication, to develop a multilevel framework for deception severity in CMC that forms 
the basis for our hypotheses. Consider for instance two different request formulations by 
business partners in our study’s data set:  
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Business partner A: Good day! We have received an enquiry for the [...] reward we 
requested. Could you please kindly help to check whether the […] has successfully 
registered the […]? If not then there seems to be an error in your system with 
processing the reward points […].Thanks very much for your help! 
Business partner B: Is this a joke? I sent in an email asking about an offering of yours on 
Sept 5. I got an email acknowledging my request, but I received nothing else for over 
a month. About a week later, […] went ahead and ordered some items with our 
reward points, including the item I asked about […]. Once again, I got an 
acknowledgement that you received my email, but absolutely nothing else […]. 
Thanks 
Notice that both partners essentially request the same thing, a redemption of rewards as part 
of the partner program. Yet, already at the micro level, their word use differs. For example, 
partner A, whom the account manager identified to have made a severely deceitful request 
here, makes much less effort to expound the situation. He also uses fewer reference words 
(e.g., personal pronouns like I, them, and her), avoids contextually embedding the situation 
(e.g., providing times and places), and avoids providing other clarifying descriptions (e.g., 
adjectives). Partner B, whom the account managers identified to be rightfully frustrated and 
her request fully legitimate, uses more reference words (e.g., I, my) and makes an effort to 
contextualize her request (e.g., on Sept 5, over a month).  
Although the macro-level cues are not easy to detect, consider the partner A’s request 
full of causality and cognitive process words in every sentence (e.g., although, if, whether). 
Partner B instead tends to use these words more sporadically, leaving her argument 
development partially unstructured. At the meta level (interactional-level), Buller and 
Burgoon [21] propose that deceivers, in an attempt to invoke liking and empathy, mimic 
(their perceptions of) receivers’ behavior. Thus, we would expect partner A to rapidly adapt 
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to the writing behavior or linguistic style of his conversation partner during the e-mail 
exchange process [35]. 
 
Micro-Level Deception Cues 
First, corroborating mixed findings at the micro level, we discern five word and word-
combination cues of deception severity and develop hypotheses about their predictive value. 
Referencing. Severe deceivers tend to withdraw and communicate less. Ekman [33] as 
well as Zuckerman, DePaulo and Rosenthal [30] show that deceivers experience feelings of 
guilt or apprehension about deceiving, so they are less forthcoming and appear distant. Such 
acts appear as a lack of “categorical references” [23, p.74]. The speech act of referencing 
pinpoints and identifies the people involved [7], whereas fewer references to the self or others 
(e.g., I, them, her) constitute linguistic constructions that distance the speaker from his or her 
message [36]. For example, “One could believe this” is more impersonal than “I could 
believe this.” As such we hypothesize that, in B2B communication, fewer personal pronouns 
reflect partners’ intentions to distance themselves from their message as well as a linguistic 
cue of more severe deception: 
H1a: Referencing relates negatively to deception severity in CMC. 
 
Contextual embedding. Deceivers avoid describing the context [37]. Contextual 
embedding connects a message to actual events [12]. Linguistically, the extent to which 
speakers substantiate the circumstances of an account is manifest in their use of spatial and 
temporal context words (e.g., down, in, end, until) [38]. Deceivers either choose not to [21] or 
are unable to [37] describe situational circumstances in their account. In CMC, the reluctance 
or inability to embed messages, marked by the use of fewer context words, may indicate the 
severity of a business partner’s deception. Thus: 
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H1b: Contextual embedding relates negatively to deception severity in CMC. 
 
Detailing. Severe deceivers use relatively fewer descriptions in their accounts [7]. 
From a speech act perspective, descriptive adjectives explicate an account [23]. Although 
Zaparniuk, Yuille, and Taylor [38] find that deceivers strategically bury the deception in 
“vivid and concrete descriptions of superfluous details” that make a message seem rich in—
albeit unnecessary—specifics, most research suggests that deceivers tend to avoid detailed 
descriptions [e.g., 7]. We hypothesize that in CMC less descriptive adjectives indicate more 
severe deception, as the partners aim to avoid being caught on details. 
H1c: Detailing relates negatively to deception severity in CMC. 
 
Self-deprecating. Knowing their intent is insincere, deceivers work to rule out 
uncertainty about their own actions [39]. For example, deceivers consciously exclude 
“unfavorable, self-incriminating details” [38, p. 344]. Linguistically, self-deprecation 
becomes evident through references to the self (first-person pronouns) in combination with 
discrepancy words (e.g., “I could,” “I should,” “it might be just me”; [40]). We propose that 
in CMC severely deceitful partners are apprehensive of questions about the legitimacy or 
appropriateness of their own conduct and thus less likely to disparage it. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
H1d: Self-deprecating relates negatively to deception severity in CMC. 
 
Flattering. Deceivers are motivated to appear increasingly pleasant and thus use 
compliments and flattery [21]. Flattery seeks to increase or consolidate rapport with the 
conversant [41, p.442] and is common in CMC [42, 43]. Linguistically, flattery results from 
the use of achievement words (e.g., “the best,” “hero,” “great”) in combination with a 
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reference to the conversant (second-person pronouns) [41]. Though flattery in itself is 
acceptable in CMC, more flattery may reflect an ulterior, more harmful motive through faked 
solidarity by business partners [21, 41]. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
H1e: Flattering relates positively to deception severity in CMC. 
 
Macro-Level Deception Cues 
Macro-level speech acts reflect how a speaker develops and structures her rationale 
(e.g., coherence, flow) [15]. Ekman [33] and DePaulo et al. [44] emphasize the need to attend 
to such macro aspects in communication when assessing deception. For example, Ekman [33] 
notes that deceivers’ fears of being caught, while aiming to be as convincing as possible, 
likely are manifest in the form of over-rehearsed arguments. Particularly if there is time to 
prepare (e.g., in e-mail exchanges), “too smooth a line may be the sign of a well-rehearsed 
con man” [45, p.185].  
Linguistically, a cohesive level of argumentation across the series of sentences in a 
message, rather than varying between more and less reasoning, signals such consistent 
structuring (e.g., using words such as “because,” “although,” and “if” consistently in every 
sentence of a message). Even if messages contain arguments in several sentences, people 
naturally vary the reasoning intensity across those sentences [46]. Goldkuhl [20] identifies 
that deceivers’ tendency to over-structure their message development gets exacerbated in 
highly motivating contexts, such as B2B communication. Accounting for within-message 
argument structuring in CMC should improve assessments of deception in B2B 
communication. Specifically, we posit that partners’ cohesive argument structuring signals 
deception severity at the macro level.  
H2: Cohesive argument structuring relates positively to deception severity in CMC. 
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Meta-Level Deception Cues 
Mimicking increases deceivers’ likelihood of success, as Campbell et al. [47] explain: 
Recipients of messages from speakers who have assimilated their communication style, 
exhibit high levels of trust and tend to comply with requests. Such common ground 
perceptions in written communication may occur through the largely unconscious process of 
linguistic style matching (LSM) [35]. The convergent use of similar linguistic styles enhances 
understanding and perceptions of a common social identity while decreasing perceptions of 
social distance [22]. In online text-based negotiations, closer matches in function word usage 
(e.g., uses of pronouns, articles, conjunctions, prepositions, auxiliary verbs, high-frequency 
adverbs, negations, and quantifiers) as part of the interactional exchange increase 
interpersonal rapport and agreement among potential partners [48]. Although in B2B 
communication, partners may naturally accommodate each other’s communication style due 
to genuine liking, their tendency to do so immediately and rapidly ought to be weaker. If 
during the interactional exchanges, partners rapidly alter their linguistic style to create a 
closer match with their conversant’s linguistic style, this may indicate deception. In effect, we 
hypothesize: 
H3: Rapid LSM during interactional exchanges relates positively to deception severity 
in CMC. 
 
Empirical Study 
Setting: The CMC Field 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a field study, in cooperation with a global 
Fortune 100 technology vendor. The data for our study comprises of archival, unstructured 
CMC (e-mails) between the company’s account managers and its channel partners. All 
partners participate in the company’s reward program, which includes approximately 120,000 
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partners worldwide. This research setting is relevant for testing our hypotheses for several 
reasons. First, emails serve as the sole means that partners use to request their rewards and on 
which the vendor’s account managers rely to assess the legitimacy of those requests. The 
absence of vocal (e.g., tone of voice) and physical cues (e.g., gaze, posture) makes a focus on 
linguistic markers imperative in such a CMC system. Second, in this reward program, 
significant monetary and non-monetary rewards (ranging from US$100 to US$100,000) are 
requested and issued. Third, the communication procedures and duration for each request 
within- and between-partners are very similar, increasing the comparability of the requests.  
Sample 
The sample consisted of 16,768 e-mails about reward requests, requested and 
processed between 1 June 2013 and 4 February 2014. The reward program is set up to award 
monetary incentives for partners’ sales and training performance. All CMC with partners 
therefore included monetary reward pay-outs due to their actual (or fabricated) performances. 
The program incorporates 11 different languages, but for feasibility and to ensure robust 
insights, we only included messages written in English in our sample. In addition, for the text 
analysis part of our measurement development we used the Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count (LIWC) text mining software which is primarily validated in the English language 
context [49]. We manually corrected all spelling mistakes and removed automated e-mails 
(e.g., out-of-office replies), resulting in a final sample of 8,886 e-mails (4,496 from partners 
and 4,390 from account managers), concerning 2,420 requests made by 1,320 partners. On 
average, each partner wrote 3 e-mails per request, which contained an average of 5 sentences 
and 20 words per sentence.  
Measurement Development 
Although the request was generally presented in the first e-mail a partner sent, the 
discussion about its legitimacy could take place over several, sequential interactive exchanges 
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and thus span several e-mails. We first derived our cues, using the LIWC software, at the e-
mail level, using words, word combinations, and the overall structure of the email. Meta-level 
cues (i.e., LSM) were measured at the interactional exchange level of emails. We then 
aggregated all scores to the request level. Our dependent measure—deception severity—the 
vendor’s account managers determined externally for each request, investigating first whether 
a request was legitimate and then how severe the deception was, using the dimensions which 
Buller et al. [16] established. We outline our measure development below. 
Dependent variable. In accordance with recent conceptualizations of deception in 
information systems research [31] and drawing on Buller and Burgoon [21], we asked the 
account managers to investigate and evaluate all reward requests in the sample. Prior to the 
observation period, during which five managers investigated all reward requests, they were 
briefed that the study was intended to uncover linguistic elements which would relate to 
deceitful reward requests. Similar to Burgoon et al.’s [50] approach, we instructed the 
managers to attribute a score of 1 if (following their investigation) a request was completely 
legitimate and truthful. If this was not the case we asked them to rate the overall deception 
severity (scored 2-5) based on the extent to which statements were untrue (falsification), 
seemed to omit or withhold relevant information (concealment), and/or requests seemed 
evasive, indirect, or vague (equivocation).Thereby all requests were judged on a single-item, 
5-point Likert-type scale where the most severely deceitful requests scored 5.  
Independent variables. We considered three levels of speech acts: micro- (i.e., word 
use and combination of word uses), macro- (i.e., within-message development), and meta-
level (i.e., between-message interactional exchanges). We provide illustrative examples in 
Table 2. To ensure an overall deductive approach which future scholars and IS practitioners 
find generalizable and easily replicable, we followed Tausczik and Pennebaker’s [49] 
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approach and text mined all partner emails, using LIWC dictionaries and the LIWC program, 
rather than building dictionaries based on specific text samples in our dataset.  
Accordingly, we determined referencing to self and others as the ratio of personal 
pronouns to the total amount of words in an e-mail. We operationalized contextual 
embedding as the proportion of relativity words. For detailing, we measured the proportion of 
adjectives. Because no LIWC text mining dictionary exists for adjectives, we compiled a 
dictionary with 1,656 unique adjectives for this study, using online dictionary sources (i.e., 
enchantedlearning.com, the Oxford dictionary, thesaurus.com, and yourdictionary.com). For 
each of the text-mined, micro-level, speech act cues (               ), we constructed a 
request-level measure by dividing the number of cue words (CueWords) in a particular 
speech act category (j) within the e-mail (e) by the total amount of words (Words) in that e-
mail (e). We then calculated the average ratio across all e-mails (E) for the same request (r). 
Our formula for calculating these speech act cues is thus: 
                 
∑
          
         
 
,      (1) 
where                  represents either referencing, contextual embedding, or detailing, 
respectively.  
To construct the combinations of word use measures of self-deprecating and 
flattering, we next text mined the proportion of co-occurrences within each individual 
sentence of first-person pronouns and discrepancy words, and then second-person pronouns 
and achievement words. Conservatively, we measured only co-occurrences for which a 
pronoun was the only one in that sentence. Thus, we were certain that either the partner or the 
account manager was the sole subject of the sentence. We created these composite speech act 
cues (                        c) by summing the amount of co-occurrences in an e-mail 
(e) first, then aggregating these use intensities across all e-mails (E) for a particular request 
(r). Our formula for calculating these composite speech act cues is thus 
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∑ (                         )
   
 
,  (2) 
where composite speech act cuerj represents either self-deprecating or flattering. 
 Next, to construct the measure of structuring across the sentences of an e-mail, we 
computed variation in the cognitive process words. Most research that has examined writing 
behavior (dis)similarities uses direct consensus models (i.e., taking the average as the 
preferred level of aggregation). Yet recent research highlights that within-message variability 
or dispersion composition models might assess writing behavior and its implications more 
appropriately [51]. We therefore created an argument structuring measure in which we (1) 
summed the use of cognitive process words in each sentence in each e-mail, (2) calculated the 
structuring at the e-mail level as 1 divided by the within-e-mail variability in cognitive 
process word uses across all sentences, and (3) aggregated e-mail level coherences across all 
e-mails in a particular request (r).  
For LSM, we followed recent research on interactional exchanges in CMC [22] and 
calculated it as the degree to which a partner produces usage intensities of function words 
that are similar to those the account manager used in the previous e-mail. First, we text mined 
the proportion of function word (CueWords) uses for each of the nine function word 
categories [35]. These categories comprise all 464 function words in the English language: 
articles, auxiliary verbs, common adverbs, conjunctions, impersonal pronouns, personal 
pronouns, prepositions, negations, and quantifiers. We measured the proportion of function 
words (       ) for each e-mail (e) and for each function word category (j) by dividing the 
number of words belonging to the particular function word category by the number of words 
in the same e-mail (e): 
                 (
          
      
)      (3) 
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Second, we derived the degree of a partner’s LSM in each individual request (c) for each 
function word category (j) separately. The differential use of each function word category (j), 
between the account manager’s (m) previous e-mail (T1) and the partner’s (p) response e-
mail (T2), came from the formula: 
        
(            
               
   )
(            
                
          )
,    (4) 
where       is the degree of overlap between the usage intensity of a function word category 
(j) by the partner (p) and the usage intensity of the same function word category (j) by the 
account manager (m). We added .0001 to the denominator to prevent empty sets. We 
calculated the partner’s overall LSM at the e-mail level by averaging the nine separate 
degrees of LSM for each function word category. Finally, we calculated median partner LSM 
across all e-mails for a particular request. 
 [Please insert Table 2 about here] 
Control variables. In addition to the speech act cues at the request level, we controlled 
for demographics, which may affect people’s writing styles, at the partner level. Specifically, 
following previous research [e.g., 52, 53], we controlled for years of work experience in the 
field (           ) of 1073 partners, and their gender (    ), coded as 1 = female and 0 = 
male, for 1223 partners. We also coded whether they included an e-mail 
signature              (coded 1) or not (coded 0). Research suggests the relative motivation 
to deceive may alleviate the leakage effects. To rule out such an effect as an alternative 
explanation for our deception severity measure, we included scaled variables for the factored 
monetary amount for 940 request cases and account size of 168 partners. We assigned all 
missing observations (where we did not have the background information on experience, 
gender, monetary amount of the request and account size) a score of  zero, for each variable 
after standardization (i.e., assigned missing observations the mean value), then included the 
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dummies in our multilevel regression analyses to control for missing observations (for a 
discussion of this standard imputation technique, see [45]). Therefore, we were able to use 
the full set of e-mails and requests collected to analyze speech act cues that were not missing 
due to a lower level of abstraction, such as simple word use or were lacking partner-level 
observations. Furthermore, deception severity may also relate to the writers’ ability to 
converse in the English language. While English is the common global business language, we 
included a dummy variable coded 1 if a partner request was send from a native English-
speaking country (e.g., Australia, India, the UK, the US, etc.) or 0 if not (e.g., Belgium, 
Germany, the Netherlands, etc.) to account for English language ability. Importantly, 
incidences where partners stopped responding to questions were likely to be cases where they 
gave up trying to deceive in a CMC sequence and hence may further predict deception 
severity. Accordingly, we text mined the account managers’ replies for question marks (“?”), 
indicating a request for more information in a communicative sequence. We dummy coded 
all request communication streams and denoted a 1 if the very last email in the email 
exchange included a request (question) by the manager and there was no later response by the 
partner. All other requests were coded 0.  Finally to control for potentially systematic 
disagreement between individual managers from one-another, we include 4 dummy variables 
(DM1-DM4 ) in all our models which control for the 5 managers who rated a particular request 
scenario. 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Results 
To capture the estimates of the explanatory variables at the request and partner levels 
and thereby predict deception severity in individual requests, we specified a series of 
multilevel regression models, often referred to as hierarchical linear models (HLMs). This 
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approach is appropriate for the current data structure, because it accounts for 
interdependencies among requests (e.g., multiple requests by the same partner), whereas 
standard regression techniques do not and instead assume that each observation is 
independent of the others [54]. Our data contained multiple requests nested within any given 
partner, and the HLM modeling approach appropriately controlled for the possibility that 
communication behavior in e-mails from the same partner would be more similar to one 
another than to e-mails from another partner. It also supported the simultaneous testing of the 
explanatory variables at the request and partner levels [55].  
Before estimating the hypothesized relationships, we sought to determine whether 
there was any significant between-group variation in our dependent variable, a prerequisite 
for conducting multilevel analysis [56]. We first estimated a baseline ordinal regression 
model (intercept only) that included only the dependent variable (deception severity), then 
conducted a baseline multilevel ordinal regression (intercept only) that included deception 
severity as the dependent variable and a random effect for the partner as a grouping variable. 
A likelihood ratio test indicated that the multilevel ordinal regression model provided 
significantly better fit than the non-nested ordinal regression model (χ2(1) = 643.93, p < .001), 
indicating the appropriateness of multilevel modeling for testing our hypotheses.  
To determine the extent to which the variation in deception severity was due to the 
grouping variable (partners), we calculated the intra-class correlation (ICC) statistic for 
multilevel ordinal regression models [56], which reveals a ratio of between-group variance to 
total variance. The ICC value of .72 indicated that differences between partners, in terms of 
the severity of their deception, accounted for a large percentage of the total variance in 
deception severity. Certain partners were consistently less (or more) severe. We thus found 
convincing evidence that partner characteristics can exert direct influences on the severity of 
their deception.  
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We next specified a series of multilevel ordinal regression models to estimate the 
effect of the antecedent request- and partner-level variables on deception severity. We 
specified this model because of the skewed distribution of our deception severity measure, 
with 59.5% of requests identified as truthful (i.e., coded 1), 33.8% deceitful requests (coded 2 
or 3), and 6.7% severely deceitful requests (coded as 4 or 5), We relied on the R “ordinal” 
package [57] to estimate the models, beginning with the intercept only Model 0. We 
introduced the individual-level variables related to micro-level speech act cues in Model 1, 
then included individual-level variables related to macro-level speech act cues in Model 2. 
We accounted for the individual-level variables related to the meta-level speech act cues in 
Model 3. The group-level covariates remained for all consecutive models (1–3) to ensure 
comparability (see table 4). We assume an independent correlation matrix. The correlation 
matrix in Table 3 and the maximum variance inflation factor score (1.77) indicated no 
potential threat of multicollinearity. For interpretability, we standardized all predictor 
variables at the request level before conducting the analyses, turning each variable into a z-
value. Using 2 difference tests, we confirmed that the request- and channel partner-level 
explanatory variables added explanatory power to the final model (see Table 4, Models 0–3). 
Model 1 provided a better fit (χ2(10) = 219.14, p < .001) than Model 0. Model 2 yielded a 
significantly better fit than Model 1 (χ2(2) = 8.73, p < .01), and Model 3 had substantially 
more explanatory power than Model 2 (χ2(2) = 11.73, p < .001). We took all the standardized 
estimates from our final Model 3; the estimates provided support for most of the hypotheses.  
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
 For each explanatory variable in our models, we calculated the odds ratio (OR) as a 
measure of the effect size, such that it provides the odds of a one-unit increase in deception 
severity, given a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable, ceteris paribus. An OR greater 
than 1 indicates an increase in the odds of deception severity with increases in the 
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explanatory variable, whereas an OR less than 1 indicates a decrease in those odds when the 
explanatory variable increases. Because we standardized the continuous explanatory variables 
in our models prior to analysis, the OR indicates the odds of increasing one unit in deception 
severity, given a one standard deviation increase in the variables. For example, in the final 
model, the OR for structuringr was 1.5, so when structuringr increased by one standard 
deviation in a request, the odds of deception severity increasing by one unit should be 
multiplied by 1.5. This intuitive ratio provides a means to explain the effect size of each 
individual explanatory variable, as well as compare the effect sizes across different 
explanatory variables. 
We report the effects of the micro-, macro-, and meta-level speech act cues in Table 4. 
First, we considered each micro-level cue separately. The results support our overall 
prediction that deception severity co-varies with different (combinations of) word uses; this 
co-variation was statistically significant and negative for referencing (   = -.31, p < .01), 
positive for detailing (   = .13, p < .05), negative for self-depreciating (   = -.17, p < .05), 
and positive for flattering (   = .17, p < .01), in support of H1a, H1c, H1d, and H1e. However, 
no statistically significant effect emerged for contextual embedding (   = -.09, p = .18), so 
we cannot confirm H1b. Second, we examined the effect of macro-level speech act cues and 
found that, consistent with H2, cohesive structuring related significantly and positively to 
deception severity (   = .35, p < .01). Third, regarding the effect of meta-level speech act 
cues, LSM was statistically significant (   = .26, p < .01), in support of H3, such that rapid 
LSM during interactional exchanges indicated more severe deception. For robustness 
purposes and to derive the linguistic effects in isolation, we re-analyzed model 3 excluding 
all control variables. These results remain similar, with no difference in significance for any 
of the effects reported above. Fourth, the findings pertaining to the control variables indicated 
that deception severity did not differ with channel partners’ use of an e-mail signature. We 
24 
 
24 
 
also did not find a significant relationship between the monetary amount of the request (    = 
-.28, p = .12) and the account size of the partner (    = -.30, p = .26) on the one hand and 
deception severity on the other. In line with Anders et al. [53] we found that working 
experience and deception severity relate negatively, such that channel partners with more 
working experience appeared less deceitful (    = -.55, p < .05). Furthermore, in line with 
Hitsch et al. [52], women were significantly less deceitful than men (β12 = -.76, p < .05). 
Requests originating from English-speaking countries were positively and significantly 
related to deception severity (    = .90, p < .01). The failure to respond to a request by the 
managers further significantly related to partners’ deception severity (   = .26, p < .01). None 
of the dummy variables for the account managers were significantly related to deception 
severity, ruling out potential bias due to systematic differences in deception severity ratings. 
Using a classification table, we found that our model accurately classifies 70.13% of requests 
into legitimate and truthful (score 1) or illegitimate and deceitful (score 2-5). Excluding the 
partner-level control variables and including only the linguistic cues achieved an accuracy of 
60.02%.  
Notably, for all models we used all communication incidences (e.g., several emails 
per request). More interactions may however have meant a greater opportunity for the 
company to scrutinize the partner. Thus, in the later email exchanges, the deceiver may have 
had less degrees of freedom to, for example, withhold details. This may have lead to the 
nonsignificant relationship between an increased use of adjectives and deception severity. 
Therefore, as a further post-hoc examination, we re-conducted our final model including only 
the first, incoming emails per request (excluding LSM since this is an exchange-based, meta-
level cue). We find that, when considering first emails only, the effects remain the similar, 
with the exception of flattery (      = .04, p = .53) and cohesive structuring (      = .17, p 
= .08). Offering an explanation for some of the discrepancies between previous experimental 
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research that focused on deceptive monologues and research that focused on communicative 
cues in dialogues, this result shows that flattering and structuring, in addition to being micro- 
and macro-level cues, may well be partly meta-level communicative acts too. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
With CMC as a primary means to support coordination and decision-making in 
business-to-business (B2B) relationships, it is important to explore how to counter the 
vulnerabilities to deception that may result from its use. While extensive literature addresses 
the benefits of information-sharing between businesses, such as the potential generation of 
additional relational rents [58], limited research is devoted to uncovering means to safeguard 
against falsification, concealment, and equivocation in these systems [31]. Some deception is 
tolerated in business interaction, yet severe deception negatively affects performance and 
increases management costs [59]. The complexities and subtleties of deception, along with a 
barrage of CMC employees face every day, however, makes detecting deception a formidable 
challenge for CIOs and IT managers [6]. In this paper, we develop a framework for deception 
detection that may aid the design and management of enhanced information systems. While 
there is voluminous research on deception and on CMC, there is a relative scarcity of 
theoretical and empirical work at their intersection, especially for B2B communication. In 
line with recent conceptualizations of information systems as symbolic action systems [60], 
our study is firmly grounded in speech act theory and advocates a multilevel framework, 
incorporating single words (i.e., micro-level), structural (i.e., macro-level) and interactional 
(i.e., meta-level) speech acts. This study contributes to the extant information systems 
research on CMC-based deception in three ways.  
Corroborating experimental research in CMC, we found that four micro-level speech 
acts relate to deception severity in such B2B communication. Severely deceitful CMC lacked 
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self- and other-referencing (e.g., fewer personal pronouns), likely because partners sought to 
draw less attention to and avoid mentions of the people involved in the message [10, 36]. 
Business partners seemed to dismiss ownership of and put psychological distance between 
themselves and the deceitful message. Contrary to the relationship we predicted, detailing 
(e.g., the use of adjectives such as “sublime,” “brilliant”) appeared positively related to 
deception severity. DePaulo [24] suggests that descriptions of imagined events should contain 
fewer perceptual details, but a more recent meta-analysis revealed that the negative 
association between details and deception may be limited to handwritten accounts [61]. As 
people gain experience with constructing an extended, digital self or selves [62], they might 
also become more adept at burying their deception in rich, superfluous detail. With these 
insights, we reconcile some equivocal prior findings and assumptions about the use of 
detailed descriptions in CMC.  
Furthermore, less self-deprecating and more flattering appear linguistic markers of 
business partners’ deception severity. Compared with low levels, severely deceitful partners 
less frequently combined discrepancy words, such as “should” and “could,” with first-person 
pronouns, and they more frequently combined achievement words, such as “earn” or “hero,” 
with second-person pronouns. Regarding self-deprecating, DePaulo et al. [39] similarly 
suggest that deceivers refrain from it to avoid any implications of blame. Regarding 
flattering, our field study confirms Gordon’s [63] laboratory experiments, in which he finds 
that linguistic elements of flattery and praise indicate severe deception. However, contrary to 
Fuller et al. (2009) as well as Schelleman-Offermans and Merckelbach [64], we did not find a 
negative relation between contextual embedding and deception in CMC by business partners. 
This speech act describes the spatial location and timely occurrence of an event; apparently, 
given the expectations in business communication, even severe deceivers cannot avoid 
contextualizing the place and time of the event that “entitled” them to request benefits. Even 
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if partners aimed to deceive by imagining an event or borrowing from actual experience, it 
seems the time and place or the context in which the fabricated event occurred still needed to 
appear in their CMC to avoid negative expectancy violations [65, 66]. 
Beyond micro-level cues, we draw on conceptualizations of macro-level speech acts 
[34] to identify cohesiveness in message development as a first, higher-order linguistic 
predictor of deception severity in CMC. In our study, severely deceiving business partners 
structured their argumentation excessively, arguably to remove doubt and avoid detection. 
This finding is in line with DePaulo et al.’s [7] assertion that deceivers appear overly 
rehearsed, an impairment that seems exacerbated in highly motivated liars [44]. Our 
examination also highlights the importance of text structure as a macro-level speech act that 
allows for a more comprehensive understanding of cues of deception in CMC and 
supplements information system design for deception detection.  
At the meta level, we profile deception in CMC by analyzing between-message 
interactional exchanges between business partners in a reward program. The degree of 
partners’ linguistic style matching with the account manager’s style was found to be a second 
higher-order, linguistic indicator of deception severity in CMC. DePaulo [67] demonstrates 
that deceivers are more concerned with their impression on others, a concern that is less 
present in truth tellers. Buller and Burgoon [21] propose that deceivers tend to mimic (what 
they perceive to be) receivers’ behavior. Our approach, consistent with a speech act 
perspective, empirically validates that deceivers actively adapt their communication behavior 
through LSM to maximize their chances of success. 
Limitations and Directions for Research 
The limitations of our research reveal some avenues for further research. First, our 
examination of speech act cues of deception sought to aid a more holistic understanding of 
deception in CMC and provide a complementary, additive examination, at the expense of 
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focusing on predictive accuracy. Although this type of model maximizes interpretation and 
meaning and yields direct estimates of predictor–outcome relationships, additional studies 
should seek to enhance predictive accuracy too. Further research might investigate 
theoretically unfounded linguistic cues of deception (see Table 1), transfer findings about 
other nonverbal cues to CMC [cf., 7], or include multiple tests to measure deception severity 
to increase predictive accuracy. Such studies may also further test the relation between the 
linguistic cues and the three deception dimensions, namely falsification, concealment, and 
equivocation [50]. 
 Second, we derive linguistic markers to approximate speech acts, yet the scope of our 
study was limited to relatively anonymized CMC data. The significant overall explanatory 
power of the observed (e.g., work experience, gender, revenue, native language) and 
unobserved partner-level characteristics collectively explain 72% of variation in partners’ 
inclination to write deceitful messages. They demonstrate the importance of accounting for 
partner-specific characteristics as relevant cues of deception in CMC. What remains to be 
investigated is what forces certain partners to deceive more. It appeals to intuition that 
partners should deceive more when they stand a chance of gaining more. Mazar, Amir, and 
Ariely [68] however find that deception does not increase with the amount of money 
involved. Relatedly, neither in our research nor in others [69] is there a relationship between 
the size of an account and deception. In other words, deception detection seems to go beyond 
the standard economic considerations of value of external payoff. Viable future research 
should aim to investigate such relationships. Although we control for English language 
ability, cross language difference and/or cultural differences and their relationship to 
deception severity or the perception thereof would complement such research designs [70], 
also given the global nature of business operations today. More understanding is also needed 
on the personal factors that make receivers more susceptibility to deceitful CMC [71]. 
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Third, the study setting may have limited the generalizability of our findings. That is, 
we examined deception in a CMC-based system for managing a reward program. Other 
settings might not share the same specificities. For example, Anderson and Simester [72] 
suggest that fake reviews are widespread in consumer-to-consumer communication on online 
retail sites. The distinctive effects of communication in this, or other context, could offer 
interesting research opportunities related to integrity and deception detection. 
Practical Implications 
CMC systems have become the pervasive channel for most types of inter-
organizational communication. Given the scope and scale of unstructured CMC and the 
natural human deficiency that limits their successful investigation, CIOs and IT managers 
need to mitigate the risks of severe deception in everyday business communications. Our 
proposed framework has important implications, which we outline below. 
First, firms communicating and exchanging information and requests via CMC 
systems can use the linguistic cues for deception identified in this study and train managers to 
improve their intuitive skills for judging incoming e-mails. Such cue-based training has 
recently been shown to be very effective [6] and should better safeguard users by knowing 
how to detect the cues that leak from deceivers. 
Second, managers should proactively implement systems to prevent deception in 
CMC. For example, the introduction of closed question forms (vs. open e-mail formats) give 
business partners basic decision rules to follow (e.g., identifying the actors involved), thus 
reducing their freedom to use deceitful formulations. Such system and interface changes 
promoting higher involvement and mutuality between managers and partners is likely to 
improve decision making and reduce deception due to increased rapport [73]. 
Third, we advocate a multilevel framework for designing systems to support 
deception detection through text analysis. While our study delineates and validates general 
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linguistic cues at each of the three levels, the inclusion of partner level characteristics boosts 
the overall classification accuracy to 70% highlighting the importance of personal and 
context-specific cues. While this research does not offer insight into how to deal with 
deceivers, noting the time and resources necessary to manually investigate CMC in detail, our 
text analysis approach can help companies streamline their investigations and tailor their 
audits to messages which have been automatically pre-classified as potentially severely 
deceitful. Such information systems support rather than supplant managerial decision-making 
and would have to be carefully integrated to not threaten the human experts judging 
deception [74] 
In conclusion, this study provides a better understanding of the linguistic markers of 
deception severity, spanning all three levels of CMC. This understanding may enable 
management to design information systems and provide employee training to safeguard 
against losses and risks in CMC. As a result, they can detect, deter, and prevent severe 
deception in business-to-business communication, and untangle any web of lies.  
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Table 1. Relevant Studies  
Article Micro-Level Cues  Context Incentive Medium 
Ali and Levine 
[75] 
Fewer negative emotions, less discrepancy, fewer modal verbs, more 
modifiers, longer speech 
Confessions or lies about trivia 
game cheating 
US$20 Video 
Anderson and 
Simester [72] 
More words, word length, family references, repeated exclamation points Reviewers writing product 
reviews that are confirmed and 
not confirmed to have purchased 
the product. 
No reward CMC 
Bond and Lee [76] More third-person pronouns, more motion words, more spatial words, fewer 
sensory-perceptual words, fewer first-person pronouns, more negative emotion 
words, more motion verbs, fewer exclusive words 
Eyewitness recollections or lies 
about crime-related video 
segments 
Group Pizza 
Party 
Audio 
Brunet [77] Fewer words, more motion terms, more self-references, fewer spatial terms, 
fewer sensory and perceptual process words, fewer tentative words 
True or fabricated stories about 
sporting or bullying events 
US$10 Video 
Fuller, Biros, and 
Wilson [78]  
More words, fewer sensory words, less lexical diversity, more non–self-
references, more second-person pronouns, more other references, more 
group pronouns, fewer spatial terms, more affect 
Real-life true or false military 
misconduct witness statements 
(non-) 
judicial 
punishment 
Written 
statement 
Hancock et al. [9] More words, more questions, more third-person pronouns, fewer causation 
terms, more sense terms, fewer first-person pronouns, more second-person 
pronouns, more negative affect terms, fewer exclusive words and negation terms 
Truths or lies about various 
conversation topics, such as 
“Discuss the most significant 
person in your life” 
Course credit CMC 
Humpherys et al. 
[79] 
More affect, greater complexity, less diversity, more non-immediacy, more 
words, more expressivity, less specificity, less uncertainty 
Real-life non-fraudulent or 
fraudulent financial statements 
 Report (10-k) 
Matsumoto and 
Hwang [10] 
More sensory and perceptual process words, fewer positive emotion words, 
more negation words, fewer tentative words, more time-related words, more 
total words used, more motion verbs, less self-referent and other referents 
Truthful or false alibis about a 
mock theft 
US$100 Written 
statement 
Newman et al. [36] Fewer first-person pronouns, fewer third-person pronouns, more negative 
emotion words, more motion verbs, fewer exclusive words 
Truthful and deceitful essays 
about views on abortion 
No reward Written 
statement 
Porter and Yuille 
[80] 
Less details, less coherence, less admitting lack of memory Truthful or false alibis about a 
mock theft 
US$5 Audio 
Schelleman-
Offermans and 
Merckelbach [64] 
Less contextual embedding, less attribution of the perpetrator’s state, fewer 
exclusive words, fewer relevant details, fewer descriptions of interactions, less 
reproductions of speech, fewer unusual details, more superfluous details, fewer 
referrals to own subjective experience, fewer motion words, more self-
referencing, fewer negative emotion words 
True and fabricated stories about 
an aversive situation in which the 
participant had been the victim 
No reward Written 
statement 
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Zhou et al. [19] More sentences and words, less lexical and content diversity, more 
modifiers, more positive affect, more negative affect, more group references, 
less plausibility, less self-referencing, fewer redundancies, fewer spatial words, 
and fewer perceptual references. 
Truthful or deceitful 
communication about solving the 
Desert Survival Problem 
Course credit CMC 
Zhou et al. [17] More pleasantness, more imagery Truthful or deceitful 
communication about solving the 
Desert Survival Problem 
Course credit CMC 
Zhou and Zenebe 
[81] 
More modal verbs, more group references, more misspelled words, more 
modifier verbs, more affect, less word diversity, less causality 
Truthful or deceitful 
communication about a mock 
theft as well as about solving the 
Desert Survival Problem 
Course credit Audio and 
CMC 
Derrick, et al. [82] Fewer words, more edits, less lexical diversity Truthful or deceitful 
communication about 
descriptions, affect, narratives, 
personality, moral 
dilemmas, comparisons, attitudes, 
and future actions 
Course credit CMC 
Pak and Zhou [83] More references, more substitutions, more ellipses, more conjunctions, more 
lexical cohesion 
 
Deception to win the mafia game  CMC 
Braun and Van 
Swol [84] 
More negations, fewer words, more questions, fewer negative emotions words, 
fewer first-person pronouns, fewer third-person pronouns 
 
Truthful or deceitful 
communication with a monetary 
negotiation game 
Course credit CMC 
Toma and 
Hancock [27] 
Fewer words, fewer first-person pronouns, more negations, less negative 
emotions 
Truthful or deceitful 
communication about online 
dating 
US$30 CMC 
Zhou, et al. [85] Fewer words, less subjunctive language, nonlinear change in uncertainty, 
more expressivity, less negative affect, nonlinear change in intensity, more 
positive affect 
Truthful or deceitful 
communication about solving the 
Desert Survival Problem 
Course credit CMC 
Notes: Variables that produced significant results in the respective study appear in bold. Unless otherwise indicated, the studies were conducted 
in a laboratory-based, experimental, comparison setting. 
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Table 2. Cues of Deception Severity: Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) Operationalization and Representative Words 
Speech Act Cue LIWC Categories Representative Words Words in Category 
Micro-level    
Referencing Personal pronouns we, them, her 70 
Embedding Relativity words area, down, until 638 
Detailing Adjectives sublime, brilliant, peerless 1,656 
Self-deprecating First-person singular pronouns with  
discrepancy words 
I, me, mine; 
should, would, could 
12 
76 
Flattering Second-person pronouns with  
achievement words 
you, your, thou; 
earn, hero, win 
20 
186 
Macro-level    
Structuring Cognitive process words cause, know, ought 730 
Meta-level    
LSM Function words an, am, to 464 
Notes: The word categories were all adopted from the LIWC text-mining dictionaries, with the exception of the adjectives. The research team 
compiled the list of 1,656 adjectives, using the following online sites: enchantedlearning.com, the Oxford dictionary, thesaurus.com, and 
yourdictionary.com. Text mining was conducted using the 2007 Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count program and the tm Package in R. 
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Table 3. Non-Standardized Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Notes: * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
  
 M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14  
Request-level 
variables 
             
    
1. DeceptionSeverityr 1.72 (1.01) 1.00               
2. Referencingr 9.50 (5.11) -.15**               
3. Contextual 
Embeddingr 
1.26 (5.75) .02 -.06**              
4. Detailingr 11.70 (6.55) .12** -.15** .21**             
5. Self-deprecatingr .31 (.52) -.06** .20** .04 -.02            
6. Flatteringr .32 (.54) .06** .01 .03 .05** .24**           
7. Structuringr 38.52 (5.53) .13** -.02 .03 -.02 -.02 -.02          
8. LSMr .46 (.28) .06* .07* .04 .04 .13** .14** -.03         
9. Signaturer .51 (.48) -.02 -.01 -.06** -.03 .03 .04 .01 .01        
10. Unanswered 
Questionr 
.02  
  
 
(.13) .14** .01 .01 .01 .01 .06** -.01 .03 .01       
11. Monetary Amountr 1373,19 (2574,83) -.05 .02 -.02 .05 .02 .06 -.02 -.05 .02 .06      
Partner-level 
variables 
                 
12. Experiencep 12.53 (7.17) -.16** -.01 .02 -.09** -.08** -.02 -.05 .03 .05 .01 .14**     
13. Sexp .25 (.43) -.11** .04 -.04 -.05 -.03 .02 -.03 -.03 .07** .02 .09 -.02    
14. NativeSpeakerp 0,84 (.37) .19** -.06** .05* .07** -.04 .01 .15** -.03 -.04* .01 -.09** -.06* .06*   
15. AccountSizep 2179,23 (4394,97) -.06 .1 -.15* -.05 -.03 .09 -.02 -.07 -.17* .14 -.13 -.25* -.14 .14  
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Table 4. Multilevel Regression Analysis 
Variables Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Estimate (SE) Odds Ratio Estimate (SE) Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate (SE) Odds Ratio 
Request-level variables          
Referencingr  -.31**  (.07)  .73 -.31**  (.07)  .73 -.32**  (.07)  .72 
Contextual Embeddingr  -.09      (.07)  .92 -.09      (.07)  .91 -.09      (.07)  .91 
Detailingr  .13*     (.07)  1.13 .13*     (.07)  1.17 .13 *    (.07)  1.14 
Self-deprecatingr  -.15**  (.08)  .86 -.16**  (.08)  .85 -.17**  (.08)  .84 
Flatteringr  .18**   (.07)  1.19 .19**   (.07)  1.20 .17**   (.07)  1.18 
Structuringr    .34**   (.12)  1.41 .35**   (.12)  1.41 
LSMr      .26**   (.09)  1.30 
Signaturer  .20       (.15)  1.21 .21      (.15)  1.22 .21       (.15)  1.24 
Unanswered Questionr  .25**   (.06) 2.47 .25**  (.06) 1.29 .26**   (.06) 1.29 
Monetary Amountr  -.28      (.17) .75 -.28     (.17) .75 -.27     (.17) .76 
Partner-level variables        
Experiencep  -.51** (.15)  .59 -.52**  (.15)  .59 -.55** (.15)  .58 
Sexp  -.70*    (.35)  .49 -.70*    (.35)  .49 -.76*   (.35)  .46 
NativeSpeakerp  .90**   (.11) 2.47 .89**   (.11) 2.45 .90**  (.11) 2.46 
AccountSizep  -.33      (.26) .71 -.33      (.26) .72 -.30     (.27) .73 
        
Log likelihood 2406.29 2296.78  2292.36  2286.49  
AIC 4822.58 4643.41  4638.71  4630.98  
N (requests) 2420 2420  2420  2420  
N (channel partners) 1320 1320  1320  1320  
Notes: All coefficients are standardized. Odds ratio (OR) = the odds of a one-unit increase in deception severity, given a one-unit increase in the 
explanatory variable, ceteris paribus. For Models 0–3, the LR test is significant (p < .01), indicating a relative increase in model fit. The 
estimates for DM1-DM4, Dc and Dp are not reported, because they do not offer any interpretative relevance. Importantly none of the account 
managers’ dummy variables (DM1-DM4) were significant, so there was no systematic difference in their rating of deception severity. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01.  
